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UNCONSCIONABILITY IN CONTRACT LAW AND IN
THE NEW SALES ACT - CONFESSIONS OF A
DOUBTING THOMAS
Reuben Hassont
A. UNCONSCIONABLITY IN GENERAL
... is there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly embedded in
the history of Anglo-American law than the basic doctrine that the courts
will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and injus-
The papers that follow represent the revised version of papers or oral remarks presented
at the Ninth Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law held in Toronto on
November 2 and 3, 1979. The impetus for the discussion were the recommendations on
unconscionability and good faith contained in the Report on Sale of Goods of the Ontario
Law Reform Commission (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1979), 3 vols.,
hereinafter cited as "Report". As will be seen, the discussion ranged well beyond the
Commission's specific recommendations. Professor Hasson's original paper also
contained a brief discussion on the doctrine of good faith. This has been omitted for the
purposes of this publication.
t Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
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tice? Does any principle in our law have more universal application than the
doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative
positions of the parties are such that one has unconscionably taken
advantage of the necessities of the other?
Thus, wrote Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in
U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. ,' one of the most remarkable -
and illuminating - cases on unconscionability.
I would like to examine the Bethlehem Steel case first because it
seems to me to demonstrate clearly the next to impossible tasks
that are delegated to the judiciary by the unconscionability
doctrine. In Bethlehem Steel, the United States government
sought a declaration that a 22% profit made by Bethlehem Steel
on a contract which involved no risk for the contractors was
unconscionable. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
refused to find that the profits made were unconscionable. The
majority showed its awareness of the social problem involved.
"In this country," wrote Mr. Justice Black, "every war we have
engaged in has provided opportunities for profiteering and they
have been too often scandalously seized". 2 Mr. Justice Black
pointed out the alternatives that were open to the government;
for example "if it chose to, the Fleet Corporation could have
foregone all negotiation over price, compelling Bethlehem to
undertake the work at a price set by the President, with the
burden of going to court if it considered the compensation unrea-
sonably low". 3 Alternatively, the government could have placed
"a fixed limit on profits" or could "recapture high profits
throught taxation".
4
In short, although my political sympathies are not with
Bethlehem Steel, I am glad that the majority decided the case the
way it did. In the first place, the court had no standard by which
to judge whether Bethlehem's 22% profit was unconscionable.
After all, as Mr. Justice Black pointed out, the salmon canneries
had been making a 52% profit 5 and the steel companies had been
making profits ranging from 30% to 320% .6 Secondly, if the court
had attempted to fix a "conscionable" rate of profit in Bethlehem,
1315 U.S. 289, at p. 326.
2 Ibid., at p. 309.
3 Ibid., at p. 303.
4 Ibid., at p. 309.
6 N;. at p*., 307.
6 Ibid., at p. 307.
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it would have been assuming responsibility for a major social
problem. The court would have received the plaudits and the
brickbats which in a democratic system belong to the elected
representatives who can be held accountable for their decisions.
Let me turn from the dramatic Bethlehem Steel case to two
more mundane cases which also illustrate the difficulties I have
with the unconscionability doctrine. In these cases, unlike the
Bethlehem Steel case, the plaintiff was successful. Despite this
fact, the cases appear to show the inadequacies of the uncon-
scionability doctrine. In the first case, Pridmore v. Calvert,7 the
plaintiff, after being involved in a motor-vehicle accident, signed
a release of all her claims for $331.40. In the event, the judge held
that the release was invalid and awarded her damages of $20,000.
There would be problems enough if the judge had said that he
was giving the plaintiff relief because $331.40 bore no "rea-
sonable relation" to $20,000 and left it at that.
Instead, the judge listed the following factors as reasons for
giving relief:
1. The plaintiff is a woman of limited intelligence.
2. The plaintiff had worked throughout her married life as a practical
nurse and in 1971 her husband died. The plaintiff had no close personal
friends to whom she turned for advice or counselling of a confidential
nature.
3. At the material time she sought no legal advice nor any lay advice
concerning the signing of the release.
4.There was no evidence to suggest that the plaintiff had any business
acumen at all, much less any knowledge of "releases".
5. The defendants' adjuster courteously arranged for an interview with
the plaintiff at her home where she was recuperating on the second day
after the accident.
6. The plaintiff's poor physical condition was apparent to the defendants'
adjuster, who observed that the plaintiff was taking pills, that she was
suffering from headaches, that she was in pain, and when walking, she did
so in a guarded fashion.
7. The defendants' adjuster knew that the plaintiff was unable to work
and was under a doctor's care.
8
One might ask why the court did not simply give the plaintiff
relief on the ground that the plaintiff had been the victim of an
extremely unequal bargain. The answer must lie in the fact that, if
the courts have a revulsion against enforcing unfair contracts as
7 (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 133 (B.C.S.C.).
8 Ibid., at p. 140.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in Bethlehem Steel,9 they have at
least as strong a commitment to freedom of contract. In the words
of Mr. Justice Anderson of the British Columbia Supreme Court
giving judgment in a recent unconscionability case: "I agree that
as a general rule, apart from fraud, it would be a dangerous thing
to hold that contracts freely entered into should not be fully
enforced." 10
In any event, decisions such as Pridmore v. Calvert1 however
pleasing they may be to supporters of the unconscionability
doctrine, 12 make it extremely difficult to advise someone who has
signed a release whether s/he is bound by it or not. In my view,
the likelihood is that the courts will give relief only in truly
egregious cases. 13 The fact that relief will be given in only a few
outrageous cases means that some insurance companies will
continue to engage in behaviour which is illegal under the
Ontario Insurance Act. 14
One might say, with a great deal of truth, that the problem of
releases has been "subsumed" instead of being "solved". 15 In my
view, it is both possible and desirable to have a statute that
regulates releases of the kind involved in Pridmore v. Calvert in
great detail.1 6 Thus, one could provide that a settlement which
did not provide say, at least 75% of what a court would have
awarded is not binding. 17 A rule of this kind would prevent the
9 Supra, footnote 1.
10 See Davidson v. Three Spruces Realty Ltd. (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at p. 492, [1977] 4
W.W.R. 460 (B.C.S.C.).
11 Supra, footnote 7.
12 See, in particular, the writings of Professor Waddams, "Unconscionability in
Contracts", 39 Mod. L. Rev. 369 (1976), and Note, 17 Western. Ont. L. Rev. 295
(1979).
13 See, for example, Beach v. Eames (1976), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 736, 18 O.R. (2d) 486
(Co. Ct.), in which the court gave relief to someone who had settled for $500 a claim for
$50,000. The court gave relief on the basis of the enormous disparity between these
figures and on the basis that "both the plaintiff and his wife appeared to me to be dull
intellectually", ibid., at p. 739 D.L.R.
14 See Part XVIII of The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224 which seeks to penalize "any
unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance".
15 See A. A. Leff, "Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause", 115
U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1966-67), at p. 559.
16 Ideally, of course, this problem should be dealt with by a universal accident and sickness
compensation scheme; see e.g., T. G. Ison, The Forensic Lottery (London, Staples,
1967); P. S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 2nd ed. (London
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975).
17 This is only one possible means of regulation. Alternatively, one could impose a duty on
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court from having to make inquiries into the victim's intelligence,
his or her marital status, his or her degree of dependence on
medication, his or her business accumen and all the other
inquiries that at present seem necessary under our cherished
system of case-by-case adjudication. Detailed regulation of this
kind would afford greater protection to accident victims 18 and
would provide guidance for the victim's legal advisers and for the
judge whose task would be made less difficult.
My second unconscionability exhibit is the already celebrated
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Tilden Rent-A-Car
Co. v. Clendenning.19  It will be remembered that Mr.
Clendenning rented a car from the plaintiff company.
Clendenning opted to pay an additional premium for "collision
damage waiver". On the face of the document it was provided
that the renter was not entitled to protection if he drove the car in
violation of any of the provisions of the agreement. On the back
of the agreement it provided that the renter was not entitled to
protection if he drank any intoxicating liquor "whatever be the
quantity". Clendenning consumed a considerable amount of
alcohol and damaged the car. Tilden now sued to recover the
damage to the car.
Before discussing the judgment of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, it should be noted that there is a very strong argument
for saying that, irrespective of any contractual conditions, it is
against public policy to allow someone in Clendenning's situa-
tion, who has damaged the plaintiffs car and who has had to
plead guilty to a charge of impaired driving, 20 to escape responsi-
bility for his actions. A majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal
did not take this approach; the majority held that Tilden could
insurance company adjusters to have settlements in cases of serious injury approved by
a master of the Supreme Court. Failure on the part of adjusters to get the approval of
the master should be made an offence. Further, it should be expressly provided that in
cases of failure to get any official approval of a settlement, the statute of limitations
would not run in favour of the insurance company.
18 My own view is that people who are in the plaintiff's position in cases such as Pridmore,
supra, footnote 7, would lose nothing by being deprived of the opportunity of receiving
paltry amounts.
19 (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400, 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (C.A.). Professor Waddams in his article,
"Legislation and Contract Law", regards the case as being "a development of contract
in the best tradition of the common law." See 19 Western Ont. L. Rev. 185 (1979), at p.
195.
20 The proportion of alcohol in Clendenning's blood also exceeded the penal limit, supra,
at p. 410 D.L.R.
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not recover for the damage caused because the unusual and
onerous clause relating to the consumption of intoxicating liquor
had not been pointed out to Clendenning. I am not sure what
significance to give to the obligation to point out unusual and
onerous terms. First of all, there is some difficulty with what is
meant by "pointing out". Is it enough if the car rental company
uses red ink? The court might easily say that "pointing out"
means an oral warning since people who rent cars are in a hurry
and cannot be expected to peruse contractual provisions. It will
be necessary to spend another say, $30,00021 to find out the
answer to that question. Let us assume that the majority requires
some form of oral warning in a later case. That still does not
dispose of the matter. It is possible after all, for a future court to
state that a renter is not bound by an unconscionable provision in
a contract, despite the fact that the clause was clearly explained to
the renter. After all, anything is possible in the unconscionability
game. 
22
The Clendenning case also leaves unresolved the question of
what are "unfair" terms in car rental contracts. Thus, courts will
have to decide in individual cases how serious the renter's
violation of provincial or federal law is before the renter is
deprived of protection. Or, to take another example, the courts
will have to rule on the fairness of the clause which provides that
the renter is responsible for all damage to the vehicle if at the
time the vehicle was being driven off a federal, provincial or a
municipal highway.
23
As I have argued elsewhere, 24 it should not be too difficult to
hammer out a standard agreement which protects the legitimate
interests of the car rental companies and which removes unfair
clauses without the need of the consumer to take his or her case
to the Ontario Court of Appeal to get a Clendenning type
decision. Car rental companies will still be able to compete on
prices. Indeed, competition should work better after terms have
21 This is my estimate of the costs of a Clendenning type case. I do not believe my estimate
to be excessive.
22 After all, even the fact that the aggrieved person has received independent advice does
not necessarily save the transaction. As Lord Denning, M.R., pointed out in Lloyds
Bank v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326 at p. 339, [1974] 3 All E.R. 757 (C.A.), "Again, I do
not mean to suggest that every transaction is saved by independent advice. But the
absence of it may be fatal".
23 Supra, footnote 19, at p. 403 D.L.R.
24 "Commentary", 3 Can. Bus. L.J. 193 (1978-79).
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been standardized. At present, it is possible for a consumer to
make a rational decision on the basis of prices only to find that his
or her calculations have been rendered worthless because he or
she has not taken into account the fact that the particular car
rental company has particularly unfair contractual terms which
the court may or may not uphold. Consumers renting cars have
better things to do with their time than comparing the contractual
terms offered by, say, twenty car rental firms. This is an exercise
which even teachers of contract law would find unrealistic; it is
even more unrealistic when we expect this exercise to be a
meaningful one for non-lawyers.
25
Nor should those who love the common law tradition feel too
unhappy about this proposed development. The common law will
still be able to intervene to protect, for example, the alcoholic
who sells his or her property at a gross undervalue.
26
B. UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE SALES ACT
(1) Consumer Sales
After that long general introduction to the problems of uncon-
scionability, I would like to examine how some problems would
be dealt with under the new Sales Act. I had better reproduce the
relevant sections of the proposed Act.
5.2(1) If with respect to a contract of sale, the court finds the contract or
part thereof to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court
may,
(a) refuse to enforce the contract or rescind it on such terms as may be
just;
(b) enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
part; or
(c) so limit the application of any unconscionable part or revise or
alter the contract so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) In determining whether a contract of sale or a part thereof is uncon-
scionable or whether the operation of an agreement is unconscionable
under section 5.7(3), the court may consider, among other factors:
25 As Professor Leff has pointed out: "It is hard to focus attention on what should not
ordinarily happen, or at least to focus as carefully as upon what will happen for sure;
i.e., the price and the nature of the goods." See his article, "Unconscionability and the
Crowd - Consumers and the Common Law Tradition", 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349 (1970),
at p. 351.
26 See Black v. Wilcox (1976), 70 D.L.R. (3d) 192, 12 O.R. (2d) 759 (C.A.).
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(a) the degree to which one party has taken advantage of the inability
of the other party reasonably to protect his interests because of his
physical or mental infirmity, illiteracy, inability to understand the
language of an agreement, lack of education, lack of business
knowledge or experience, financial distress or similar factors;
(b) gross disparity between the price of the goods and the price at
which similar goods could be readily sold or purchased by parties
in similar circumstances;
(c) knowledge by one party when entering into the contract, that the
other party will be substantially deprived of the benefit or benefits
reasonably anticipated by that other party under the transaction;
(d) the degree to which the contract requires a party to waive rights to
which he would otherwise be entitled;
(e) the degree to which the natural effect of the transaction, or any
party's conduct prior to, or at the time, of the transaction, is to
cause or aid in causing another party to misunderstand the true
nature of the transaction and of his rights and duties thereunder;
f) the bargaining strength of the seller and the buyer relative to each
other, taking into account the availability of reasonable alter-
native sources of supply or demand;
(g) whether the party seeking relief knew or ought reasonably to have
known of the existence and extent of the term or terms alleged to
be unconscionable;
(h) in the case of a provision that purports to exclude or limit a
liability that would otherwise attach to the party seeking to rely on
it, which party is better able to safeguard himself against loss or
damages; and
(i) the general commercial setting, purpose and effect of the
contract.26a
Let us examine how these guide-lines might apply to particular
situations.
(a) Door-to-door sales
Suppose that an encyclopaedia company sells encyclopaedias
door-to-door in a certain area in Toronto. The company sells
encyclopaedias for $1,400 although similar encyclopaedias can be
bought from ordinary bookstores in the city for $700. Suppose
further, that a customer was induced after five hours of sales talk
to buy a set of encyclopaedias for $1,400. A week after entering
into the contract to purchase the encyclopaedias, the customer
wishes to get relief under s. 5.2(2) of the proposed new Sales Act.
I suggest that it is virtually impossible to advise the customer with
26a Report, vol. 3.
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even the slightest degree of confidence. In the first place, a court
might decide that the plaintiff may not proceed under s. 5.2(2) of
the Act at all since the plaintiff already has a two-day cooling off
period provided him or her under The Consumer Protection
Act. 27 In short, a judge may end the whole business there and the
plaintiff may be left remediless.
Suppose, however, that the judge reaches the conclusion that s.
5.2(2) is applicable. Unfortunately that conclusion does not get us
out of the morass. The judge must now look at s. 5.2(2)(b) to
determine whether there is a "gross disparity between the price of
the goods and the price at which similar goods could be readily
sold or purchased by parties in similar circumstances". Suppose
that the judge finds that there are no other encyclopaedia
companies selling door-to-door in Toronto. Can the judge say
that the existence of one door-to-door encyclopaedia company
creates a "monopoly" situation and give relief under s. 5.2(2)(b)
taking into account "the bargaining strength of the seller and
buyer relative to each other, taking into account the availability
of reasonable alternative sources of supply or demand?" Sadly,
no one knows the answer to that question either. Again, would it
be legitimate for the court to compare the $700 price charged by
the regular bookstore with the $1,400 price charged by the door-
to-door company and give relief on that basis? Your guess is as
good as mine. Finally, what are we to make of the five-hour sales
pitch? Is this factor to count against the validity of the transaction
as indicating "unequal bargaining power" and provide a ground
for relief? Alternatively, does the existence of a five-hour sales
pitch indicate "hard bargaining" so that the transaction is
upheld? Unfortunately, it is necessary to litigate these (and
other) points in order to get any answers. Even experienced
consumer lawyers will find it extremely difficult to advise their
clients who have this kind of problem. Further, even if a
consumer protection department is able to bring an action on
behalf of the consumer, 28 it seems to me that these problems
remain intractable.
All these problems would disappear if we took the sensible step
27 R.S.O. 1970, c. 82, s. 33.
28 See s. 16(2) of the British Columbia Trade Practices Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 96, as
amended by S.B.C. 1975, c. 80, s. 9. There is no similar power vested in the Ontario
director.
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of simply outlawing door-to-door sales at least of items costing
more than say, $50. In the first place, as two recent cases from
British Columbia have reminded US, 29 door-to-door sales
generate a great deal of "pre-entry fraud". Thus, in Stubbe v.
P.F. Collier ° a seller of encyclopaedias gained entry by stating
that he was conducting a survey and, in Director of Trade
Practices v. Gerald Mason Ltd. ,31 a seller of vacuum cleaners
represented that he was offering to clean carpets, whereas he
was, in fact, selling vacuum cleaners. Nor is this "pre-entry
fraud" fortuitous; the court in Stubbe v. P.F. Collier accepted
evidence from Dr. Kelly, an expert in marketing, "to the effect
that people generally are much more likely to admit a person to
their house if the stated purpose is to conduct some sort of
survey, rather than a reasonably clear statement of intent to
sell."
32
More serious than the "pre-entry fraud" is the post-entry fraud
that occurs on a vast scale. I believe this fraud occurs largely
because the salesman is paid solely by commission. If the sales-
person does not make sufficient sales s/he will starve. This system
of remuneration, as Mr. Justice Aikins pointed out in Stubbe v.
P.F. Collier, puts great pressure on salespersons "to apply their
knowledge of selling and deviate from the prepared scripts with
effective deceptive ploys of their own".
33
Another very powerful inducement to fraud is the fact that the
salesperson knows that s/he will be impossible to contact. Very
few salespersons will leave their calling-card giving their
telephone number. In ordinary sales, the fact that the consumer
knows where to go when he or she has been cheated creates some
disincentive to engage in fraud.
In short, I think consumers would suffer less fraud and gain
more privacy if door-to-door sales were simply abolished. There
would be a considerable payoff for the judges also if door-to-door
sales were abolished. They would not have to make next to
29 Stubbe v. P.F. Collier & Son Ltd. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 605, [1977] 3 W.W.R. 493,30
C.P.R. (2d) 216 (B.C.S.C.), motion to vary allowed 85 D.L.R. (3d) 77, [1978] 3
W.W.R. 257, 41 C.P.R. (2d) 47 (B.C.S.C.); Director of Trade Practices v. Gerald




32 (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 605 at p. 614.
3 3
lbid., at p. 615.
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impossible decisions about how much fraud was acceptable and
next to impossible decisions as to whether the salesperson had
engaged in persuasion or coercion.
(b) Overpricing and unconscionability
A number of American cases have tried to deal with the
problem of whether a sale at an excessive price can be an uncon-
scionable practice.
In a number of cases, courts have held that a contract is uncon-
scionable because the seller has received an "excessive price".
34
Some of these decisions have troubled thoughtful commentators
35
because they seem to ignore that interest charges to the poor
must necessarily be higher than interest charges paid by affluent
consumers. In other words, despite the fact that the "poor pay
more", it does not follow that those selling to the poor make
more .36
As one commentator has pointed out:
If, for example, the retail market price of an item is $400, a seller who
charges $500 might appear to be charging an unconscionable price. Yet if
this seller is selling on time and assigning contracts at a 20% discount, he
receives the same amount of cash as is received by a retailer charging $400.
Salesmen's commissions and referral fees may be expected to increase the
seller's price still further. Add to this amount the interest which the buyer
must pay to the finance company, and the total amount will no doubt
exceed what the buyer would have had to pay for the same item in a large
department store on a strict cash basis.
37
There is no telling what Canadian courts will do with s. 5.2(2)
of the proposed new Sales Act when presented with an uncon-
scionable price problem. I fear that the results will be as erratic
and as unsatisfactory as the American jurisprudence on the
subject.
34 See e.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A. 2d 886
(S.C. 1964); State by Le/kowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S. 2d 303 (S.C.
1966); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County, 1966), revd 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964 (S. C. 1967).
35 See e.g., Note, "Unconscionable Sales Practices", 20 Maine L. Rev. 159 (1968); R. E.
Speidel, "Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection", 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 359
(1970).
36 See, principally, the Report of the Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on
Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices of District of Columbia Retailers (U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1968).
37 See Note, "Unconscionable Sales Practices", 20 Maine L. Rev. 159 (1968), at p. 170.
1979-80]
394 Canadian Business Law Journal
As Dean Speidel has suggested, a more sensible way of dealing
with the unconscionable price problem is to compare the net
profit made by an alleged delinquent seller
... with the net profits of similarly situated sellers selling similar goods or
services. If there is a gross disparity, the price is unconscionable. Since
costs, business risks and efficiency vary, a net profit comparison is the only
meaningful way to test for gross disparity. However, it is important that
comparisons be made with the profits of similarly situated sellers rather
than "average" net profits.
38
Attractive as Dean Speidel's solution is, I do not think that the
courts could deal with the gross overpricing problem on a case by
case basis. 39 Let us suppose that in a given case a dealer admits
that he makes net profits of 60% and the evidence shows that
other similarly situated dealers make profits of between 15% and
70% and that the average profit is 25%. Does the court give relief
in such a case on the ground that 60% is considerably in excess of
the 15% profit that many dealers make and considerably in excess
of the average profit? Your guess is as good as mine.
It seems to me that there are three choices that we have in
dealing with the problem of unconscionable price. The first is to
let the market operate. The second is to regulate directly the
prices at which goods are sold to low income consumers. The
effect of this price control would be to make credit less readily
available for those with low incomes. The third approach would
be to replace or supplement the private-sector credit industry,
where "high-risk" borrowers are concerned by creating some
kind of consumer loan program, either in the form of direct




A general unconscionability provision of the kind envisaged by
s. 5.2 of the proposed Sales Act would produce some messy (if
not incoherent) jurisprudence and it would make it more difficult
38 R. E. Speidel, "Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection", 31 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 359 (1970), at p. 373.
39 Note also the forceful comment by Professors Speidel, Summers and White: "Absent an
effective administrator with considerable power, the application of the unconsciona-
bility doctrine to the price term will be no more than a fart in a windstorm. This is so
because debtors' lawyers are generally too lazy and unimaginative to marshall the facts
necessary to prove a price unconscionability case." See Commercial and Consumer Law
lMaierilst, 2nd ed (U 174"), p. 6o.
40 See e.g., Note "An Alternative to the UCCC: Publicly Subsidized Consumer Loans", 4
Gol. Gate. L. Rev. 239 (1974).
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for us from deciding which of the three alternatives we
favoured.
41
C. EXPECTANCY DAMAGES IN CONSUMER CASES
In Custom Motors Ltd. v. Dwinell,42 a young man (the respon-
dent) of 21 who was unemployed, agreed to buy a Chevrolet
Impala for $1,395. The respondent chose a car and paid the
appellant a deposit of $500, and signed a contract to buy the car.
A few days after signing the contract, the respondent went to see
his bank manager to get a loan to pay for the car. Not surpris-
ingly, the loan was refused. The plaintiff now sought to get his
money back. The Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division
held that the respondent was entitled to his money back because
the parties had not entered into a binding contract but merely an
agreement to make an agreement. If the Nova Scotia court had
found that the parties had entered into a valid contract, would it
have been unconscionable under s. 5.2 of the proposed new Sales
Act for the appellant to have kept the $500, either as a deposit or
as expectancy damages?
The simple fact of the matter is that no one knows. All one can
say is that some judges probably would give the plaintiff relief
because they would feel that someone who thought that he could
borrow money from the bank while he was unemployed suffered
from "a lack of business knowledge or experience" under s.
5.2(2)(a) of the proposed Sales Act. Alternatively, some other
judges might refuse relief because there was no evidence of
overreaching by the defendant. Further, shortly after claiming his
$500 back, the respondent bought another car by private sale for
$1,500.
4 3
Would it not be simpler to have a rule that allowed consumers
their deposits back and disallowed claims for expectancy damages
for lost volume claims? In England, the English Court of Appeal
held in Lazenby Garages Ltd. v. Wright, 4 that it would not award
expectancy damages where a second-hand car was being sold. In
my view, it would be desirable to place the principle in Lazenby
Garages on a statutory footing and to extend it to new cars (and
41 It is, of course, possible to use a'combination (or combinations) of these three
alternatives.
42 (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 342 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.).
43 Ibid., at p. 345.
44 [19761 1 W.L.R. 459.
1979-80]
396 Canadian Business Law Journal
other consumer durables) and to give protection to consumers
who had made down-payments or deposits. After all, the reason
why many consumers seek to back out of deals is for exactly the
same reason that Dwinell did - the realization that they had
entered into a contract that was beyond their means. One could
require consumers to demonstrate on a case-by-case basis their
impecuniosity but this seems a very expensive game to play. After
all, several thousands of dollars were spent in the Dwinell case in
a dispute over $500.
Nor would merchants be seriously inconvenienced by a rule
which denied expectancy damages in consumer cases or one
which obliged them to refund deposits in executory situations.
The reasons which Fuller and Perdue advanced for awarding
expectancy damages generally: (1) that awarding expectancy
damages served to facilitate commercial transactions and (2) that
businessmen regard present promises as having future value do
not seem to have any great force in consumer transactions.
45
Moreover, Ross and Littlefield have shown that, when dealing
with middle class clients, not only do reputable dealers not claim
expectancy damages or keep deposits, 46 they also are prepared in
some cases to take back goods which have obviously been
abused. 47
D. DURABILITY AND DISCLAIMER CLAUSES
According to the Report on Sale of Goods, the revised Act will
provide that goods bought "will remain fit or perform satisfacto-
rily, as the case may be, for a reasonable length of time having
regard to all the circumstances". 48 This sounds so reasonable that
it seems churlish to raise any quarrel with it. The fact is, however,
that the question of durability has had to be litigated in case after
45 L. L. Fuller and W. R. Perdue, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages", 46 Yale
L.J. 52 (1936-37), especially at pp. 57-63.
46 H. L. Ross and N. 0. Littlefield, "Complaint as a Problem-Solving Mechanism", 12
Law & Soc. Rev. 199 (1977-78).
47 Note the following statement made by a salesman to Ross and Littlefield, ibid., at p.
208:
"Occasionally someone who is hard to sell will take a set home with him for a few
days and then want to return it. We cheerfully refund his money so he's not mad at
Western. It's better than trying to live with him. You hope that he'll come back
some day and buy something that will work for him."
48 See s. 5.13(1)(b)(vi) of the draft Bill in Report, vol. 3.
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case. Each case is like a bus ticket; it is seemingly valid for day of
issue only. The case provides no guidance for other similar cases.
This uncertainty is best seen in the car cases which have been
analyzed by Mr. Whincup.49 The protection given by the courts to
buyers of cars has varied from nothing50 to very substantial
protection. 51 Even in cases where the buyer has been able to get
protection s/he has frequently had to go to an appellate court to
get protection. 52 In these cases, one wonders whether the cost of
litigation did not exceed the cost of the car.
A further complication is added by the fact that although
disclaimer clauses are not permitted in consumer sales, 53 this does
not mean that they cannot be taken into account in determining
the extent of protection the buyer gets. A judge may, uncon-
sciously in some cases, take into account the existence of a
disclaimer clause and reduce the protection the buyer gets. In my
view, it should not be too difficult to compute a statutory tariff of
durability for both old and new cars. This tariff could be based on
the price and/or the age of the car. To be sure, the protection
afforded by the tariff would not be extravagant, 54 but the buyer
would at least be given some protection without the need for
litigation.
I have outlined some specific problems in the sales area and I
have tried to suggest precise regulation of those practices which
we find abhorrent. My suggestion is that we proscribe these
practices by legislation rather than by judicial techniques. For
one thing, it will be difficult, given the uncertainties of the uncon-
scionability doctrine, to find consumers who are prepared to
make legal history by establishing an unconscionability
4 9 M. Whincup, "Reasonable Fitness of Cars", 38 Mod. L. Rev. 660, (1975).
50See e.g., Peters v. Parkway Mercury Sales Ltd. (1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 128, 10 N.B.R.
(2d) 703 (S.C. App. Div.).
51 See e.g., Lightburn v. Belmont Sales Ltd. (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 692, 69 W.W.R. 734,
(B.C.S.C.); Charterhouse Credit v. Tolly, [1963] 2 Q.B. 683; Unity Finance v.
Hammond (1965), 109 Sol. Jo. 70.
52 See e.g., Green v. Holiday Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Ltd. (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 637,
[1975] 4 W.W.R. 445 in which case the Manitoba Court of Appeal had to remind the
trial court that the implied warranties of fitness applied to a second-hand car costing
$2,895.
53 See s. 44(a) The Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 82, as amended by S.O.
1971, Vol. 2, c. 24, s. 2(1).
54 See the tariff prescribed by the South Australian Second-Hand Motor Vehicles Act 1971
described by Professor Trebilcock, "New Approach to the Protection of Used Car
Buyers, 18 McGill L.J. 258 (1972).
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precedent. Second, unlike the situation which apparently exists in
Germany, according to Professor Dawson, 55 common law courts
generally base their unconscionability decisions on very narrow
grounds. Thus, I have tried to advise a student who rented a truck
and caused damage in the light of the decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning56 but I
felt unable to give my advice with any degree of confidence.
Judges give rulings based on narrow grounds, I suggest, because
they do not wish to take on the task of regulating various
businesses. For one thing, the courts do not have the machinery
to ascertain which clauses are unusual. The court in Tilden
asserted that the clause challenged in that case was unusual but
there was no evidence that this was, in fact, the case. A court is
also not generally in a good position to examine the business
justification for a particular clause. This kind of inquiry should
lead the courts to ask questions about, for example, the availa-
bility of insurance and, even in large commercial cases, they have
not shown any inclination to make these inquiries. 57
Further, if the courts begin to police contracts overtly, they will
attract criticism from industry groups for interfering with freedom
of contract and from consumer groups for not policing contracts
vigorously enough. I think it is important to shield them from
these kinds of criticisms. For one thing, if judges are to be agents
of political change, they must be able to reply to their critics and
few would want to see an ongoing debate between judges and
various political groups. This addition to our political process
does not appear to be a particularly attractive one. 58
55 See his article "Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version", 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1041 (1976). Professor Dawson writes, in part: "one cannot easily imagine an American
state court thundering forth quite so often [as a German court]: 'This transaction
offends the conscience and sense of decency of all fair and right-thinking persons in the
state of (Maine)' "; ibid., at p. 1124. For Maine, of course, one could insert England or
Canada. It is significant that Professor Dawson ends his article with the following words:
"We have much to learn from German law and should be willing to admire the German
achievement. It does not follow that we have the means to emulate it"; ibid., at p. 1126.
56 (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400, 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (C.A.).
57 In some cases they have not merely failed to make inquiries into the availability of insur-
ance. They have ignored it when they have been aware of its existence; see e.g.,
Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd., [1970] 1 Q.B. 447,
[197011 All E.R. 225, (C.A.); Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co. Ltd., [1977]
3 W.L.R. 90 (C.A.).
58 I find it remarkable that a whole range of commentators in various fields of law are
asking for more powers to be given to the judiciary when there is no evidence that most
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E. A NOTE ON UNCONSCIONABILITY IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
Section 5.2(2) also allows the courts to strike down clauses in
commercial contracts on grounds of unconscionability. This
bothers me far less than giving the courts power to police
consumer transactions. For one thing, businessmen seldom seem
to sue one another anyway; 59 a commercial case such as Harbutt's
"Plasticine" v. Wayne Tank,6° is such a rarity that teachers of
commercial law hug it to their bosoms for years. 61 Second, in
many areas of commercial activity, the respective groups have
hammered out the equivalent of a collective agreement. Thus, in
R. W. Green Ltd. v. Cade Bros. Farms,62 the condition in dispute
judges would welcome an increase in their power. Indeed, some outstanding judges
have expressed disquiet at the prospect of being involved in political disputes. Consider,
in this connection, for example, the remarks of Lord Wilberforce - probably the most
thoughtful British judge on the Bench at the present time. In Gouriet v. Union of Post
Office Workers, [1978] A.C. 435 (H.L.), his Lordship stated at p. 482:
The decisions to be made as to the public interest are not such as courts are fitted
or equipped to make. The very fact, that, as the present case very well shows,
decisions are of the type to attract political criticism and controversy, shows that
they are outside the range of discretionary problems which the courts can resolve.
Judges are equipped to find legal rights and administer, on well-known principles,
discretionary remedies.
Consider also the remarks of Lord Scarman in a major decision of the House of Lords
on the assessment of damages in a personal injuries case: Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and
Islington Area Health Authority, [1979] 3 W.L.R. 44 (H.L.), affg [1979] Q.B. 196
(C.A.). His Lordship stated, inter alia, at p. 48 W.L.R.:
Lord Denning appeared, however, to think - or at least to hope - that there
exists machinery in the Rules of the Supreme Court which may be adapted to
enable an award of damages in a case such as this to be "regarded as interim award
[[1979] Q.B. 196, at p. 220]". It is an attractive, ingenious suggestion - but, in my
judgment unsound. For so radical a reform can be made neither by judges nor by
modification of rules of court. It raises issues of social, economic and financial
policy not amenable to judicial reform, which will almost certainly prove to be
controversial and can be resolved by the legislature only after full consideration of
factors which cannot be brought into clear focus, or be weighed and assessed, in
the course of the forensic process. The judge - however wise, creative and imagi-
native he may be - is "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd, bound in" not as was Macbeth,
to his "saucy doubts and fears" but by the evidence and arguments of the litigants.
It is this limitation, inherent in the forensic process which sets bounds to the scope
of judicial reform.
59 See e.g., Macaulay, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business", 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 45
(1963); Beale and Dugdale, "Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of
Contractual Remedies", 2 Br. J. L. & Soc. 45 (1975).
60 Supra, footnote 57. Even this case is not a commercial law dispute; it is, alas, only a
contest between two insurance companies.
61 Compare the flood of cases in recent years on new and used cars.
62 [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 602, discussed by Professor Ziegel in "Comment", 57 Can. Bar
Rev. 105 (1979).
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was one of a standard form of conditions which had governed
relations between the National Association of Seed Potatoes
Merchants and the National Farmers' Union for over 20 years.
Members of these organizations are not likely to wish to go to
court to ask it to declare invalid part of a collective agreement.
Third, a business enterprise which wishes to challenge a
provision on the grounds of unconscionability will be able to
finance its operation to a large extent at the expense of the state
in that the cost of litigation is tax deductible as a business
expense. The consumer who wishes to challenge the fairness of a
particular clause bears the risk of paying the entire cost of litiga-
tion.
Having said that, I must confess that when the courts have had
to deal with an unconscionability problem in the commercial
field, the results have been singularly unimpressive. Sometimes,
the courts strike down disclaimer clauses which are perfectly
reasonable. 63 At other times, these disclaimer clauses will be
upheld64 - sometimes by the same court which earlier struck
down an almost identical disclaimer clause! 65
Hopefully, s. 5.2(2)(h) of the draft Sales Act which directs the
court to have regard, in the case of a disclaimer clause, to the
question of "which party is better able to safeguard himself
against loss or damages" will prevent the courts from striking
down commercial disclaimer clauses whose sole function is often
to specify which contracting party will insure.
Conclusion
When I was a graduate student in the United States between
1967 and 1970, everyone who was anyone in the field of contract
law was writing about unconscionability. 66 In the course of time
63 See e.g., Canso Chemicals Ltd. v. Canadian Westinghouse Co. Ltd. (1975), 54 D.L.R.
(3d) 517, 10 N.S.R. (2d) 306 (S.C. App. Div.) and Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor
Transport Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R. 856 (C.A.), revd [1980] 2 W.L.R. 283 (H.L.).
64 See e.g., Gillespie Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 400,
[1973] 1 All E.R. 193 (C.A.).
65 Compare, for example, the views expressed by Lord Denning, M.R., in Gillespie Bros.
v. Roy Bowles, supra, with those expressed by the same judge in Harbutt's "Plasticine"
v. Wayne Tank, supra, footnote 57 and again in Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor
Transport Ltd., supra, footnote 63.
66 See, e.g., A. A. Leff. "Unconscionabilitv and the Code - The Emperor's New
Clause", 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1966-67); J. A. Spanogle, "Analyzing Unconsciona-
bility Problems", 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 931 (1968-69); A. M. Squillante,
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the flood of articles has become a mere trickle. 67 The reason for
the loss of interest in unconscionability is not difficult to discover.
As a means of providing protection for consumers and as a means
of curtailing unethical business behavior, it is very hard indeed to
think of a more inadequate tool than the unconscionability
doctrine. The essence of that doctrine is that it takes everything
into account but gives decisive weight to no single factor. 68
Since about 1970 commentators and Legislatures have increas-
ingly focussed their attention on legislation as a means of
protecting the consumer. As Dean Speidel predicted in 1970:
"The ineluctible presence is for more legislative regulation of the
professional's trade behaviour. This legislation will increasingly
be implemented through the administrative rather than the
judicial process."' 69 Dean Speidel's prediction has, in my view,
proved to be correct. There is no major U.S. unconscionability
case that I know of in the past decade. 70 However, the last decade
has seen the enactment into law of, inter alia, the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act, 71 the Lead-Based-Paint Poisoning
Prevention Act 72 and the Consumer Product Safety Act.
73
"Unconscionability" 73 Com. L. J. 224 (1968). W. B. Davenport, "Unconscionability
and the Uniform Commercial Code", 22 U. Miami L. Rev. 121 (1967-68); E. M.
Harrington, "Unconscionability under the Uniform Commercial Code", 10 S. Texas L.
Rev. 203 (1967-68); M. B. Shulkin, "Unconscionability - The Code, the Court and the
Consumer", 9 B.C. Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 367 (1967-68); M. P. Ellinghaus, "In
Defense of Unconscionability", 78 Yale L.J. 757 (1968-69); J. E. Murray, "Unconscion-
ability: Unconscionability", 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1970); R. B. Braucher, "The
Unconscionable Contract or Term", 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 337 (1970); A. A. Leff,
"Unconscionability and the Crowd - Consumers and the Common Law Tradition", 31
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349 (1970); R. E. Speidel, "Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer
Protection", 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 359 (1970).
67 See e.g., I. Younger, "A Judge's View of Unconscionability", 5 U.C.C. L.J. 348 (1972-
73); R. W. Duesenberg, "A Practitioner's View of Contract Unconscionability", 8
U.C.C. L. J. 237 (1975-76); R. A. Epstein, "Unconscionability: A Critical Reapprais-
al", 18 J. Law & Econ. 293 (1975); L. A. Kornhauser, "Unconscionability in Standard
Forms", 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1151 (1976); A. Schwartz, "A Reexamination of Non-Sub-
stantive Unconscionability", 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1977); D. B. King, "The Tort of
Unconscionability: A New Tort for New Times" 23 St. Louis U. L. Rev. 97 (1979).
68 In this respect the doctrine of unconscionability bears a striking resemblance to the law
of negligence. See e.g., H. J. Glasbeek and R. A. Hasson, "Fault - The Great Hoax"
in Studies in Canadian Tort Law, L. Klat, ed. (Toronto, Butterworths, 1977), p. 395.
69 See his article, "Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection", 31 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 359 (1970), at p. 360.
70 If there have been any major U.S. cases on unconscionability during the past decade I
would be grateful if any kind reader would tell me of them.
71 Pub. L. 91-601,84 Stat. 1670 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 1471-1476 (1976)).
72 Pub. L. 91-695,84 Stat. 2078 (1971) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 4801-4846 (1976)).
73 Pub. L. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 2051-2081 (1976)).
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Further, amendments have been made to the Highway Safety
Acts74 and to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act. 75 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission has promul-
gated its Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses
Rule. 76 At the state level, measures such as Wisconsin's
Consumer Protection Act have been passed. 77 To be sure, there
have been defeats for consumer advocates. Thus, Congress has
rejected the Food and Drug Administration's proposed ban on
saccharin 78 and several state Legislatures have allowed the selling
of laetrile. 79 Again, Congress has overruled the Department of
Transportation's decision to require helmets for motorcyclists.
80
There are two points to be made about this catalogue of
victories and defeats. The victories could never have been
achieved through the use of the unconscionability doctrine, no
matter how often one intoned the word. As regards the defeats,
no consumer advocate anywhere expects an unending series of
victories.
It seems sad to me that we should have to learn about the
inadequacies of the unconscionability doctrine for ourselves
without learning from the American experience. Learning about
the inadequacies of the unconscionability doctrine seems to me to
be both a time-consuming and painful process. At the end of the
day there will be little to show for our efforts no matter how many
learned articles and comments we write on the subject.
74 Pub. L. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966) (codified at 23 U.S.C.A. 401-406 (1976) (amended in
1970, 1973, 1975, 1976 and 1978).
75 Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 1381-1431 (1976)).
76 See 16 C.F.R. 433 (1979). The Federal Trade Commission has also been increasingly
bold in regulating certain products which it deems to be inadequate or unsafe.
77 Wis. Stat. 421-427 (1975). See, in particular, "Recent Developments in Consumer Law:
A Symposium", [1973] Wis. L. Rev. 333. Other state Legislatures have regulated
specific consumer abuses but the Wisconsin measure is probably the most ambitious
measure passed by any state in the past decade.
78 The rejection took the form of an 18-month moratorium on the FDA's authority to ban
saccharin. Saccharin Study and Labelling Act, Pub. L. 95-203, 3, 91 Stat. 1452 (1977)
(codified at 21 U.S.C.A. 348 (supp. 1977)). The moratorium expired in mid-1979 and
the House moved quickly to extend it until 1981.
79 Seventeen states have legalized the drug; see [1978] Food Drug Cos. L. Rep. (CCH)
942,292.
80 Highway Safety Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-280, Title II 208(a), 90 Stat. 451 (codified at 23
U.S.C.A. 402(c) (1976)).
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